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Abstract
The paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 361 German
corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996. We find ownership concentration to affect
profitability significantly negatively. Representation of owners on the board of executive
directors does not make a difference. The profitability-ownership concentration relation depends
on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights. The negative effect of
ownership concentration can be traced back to family- or foreign-owned non-quoted firms as
well as quoted firms with different large shareholders. A positive impact of ownership
concentration on profitability, supportive of managerial discretion and agency theories, shows up
for quoted firms which have financial institutions as large shareholders. Our results imply that
(1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high
degree of ownership concentration seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held
German corporations.
JEL classification: G3, L1
Key words: firm performance, ownership concentration, governance structures, managerial
discretion2
Shareholders are stupid and impertinent −  stupid, because they give their funds
to somebody else without adequate control, and impertinent,
because they clamor for a dividend as a reward for their stupidity.
Carl Fürstenberg (1850-1933), German financier
1 Introduction
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) stated that in the modern corporation hired managers have
enough discretion for corporate plundering, the issue of separating ownership from control and
its resulting impact on firm performance has been placed high on the agenda of economists.
Globalizing product and financial markets have recently triggered renewed interest in the link
between corporate governance and performance among academics and business press. As firms
face new challenges from increased cross-border competition, pressures to adapt to a new
internationally integrated environment mount. Thus, the question currently being debated in
Europe and in the USA is whether established systems of corporate finance and corporate
control are still appropriate to cope with the challenges ahead.
1
A prime element of corporate governance is the alignment of shareholders'
interests with the interests of managers hired to run the firm. In this respect the Anglo-American
system relies heavily on the market mechanism to channel the flow of capital, to control its
efficient use, and to assure investors of maximizing the return on their investments. Active
markets for corporate control function as a disciplinary mechanism to sanction badly performing
firms. The threat of corporate takeovers is supposed to reign in free-wheeling managers.
2 As
markets for equity capital are highly liquid, dissatisfied shareholders can easily sell off their
holdings. The benefits typically attributed to this so-called market-based system are seen in a
better provision of finance to innovative start-up firms and higher returns to investors. The3
system, however, has been criticized for short-termism, neglect of interests other than
shareholders', and inefficiency in delivering effective corporate governance.
3
In the literature on managerial discretion and agency costs it has been argued that
the presence of a large shareholder reduces agency costs because a high stake in the firm makes
it the shareholder's very interest to control the executive managers hired to run the firm.
4
Ownership concentration thus may be the key to effective corporate governance and shareholder
value maximization.
Concentrated ownership is a salient feature of the German system of corporate
governance.
5 German corporations tend to have only one large blockholder who often commands
a super-majority interest. Small and medium-sized firms, preferably organized as private
partnerships or limited liability corporations, are typically majority-owned by individuals
(families) or are subsidiaries of large firms. Joint stock corporations with widely dispersed
outside shareholdings, as is common in the USA or the UK, are very rare.
6 The German stock
market is still of relatively small size regarding listings and market capitalization.
7 Ownership
structures are observed to be unchanged over decades, since large shareholders tend to stick to
their blockholdings even in times of very bad corporate performance. Further, close ties between
industrial firms and financial institutions (banks) (e.g. via cross-shareholdings, long-term lender-
borrower relations) seem to foster access to debt capital, thus reducing the need to attract equity
capital via the stock market. The network-like structure of the German system has effectively
thwarted any serious attempts of (un)friendly take-overs. An active market for corporate control
rights does not exist despite the recent take-over battle between Mannesmann and Vodafone.
However, in view of high unemployment and sluggish growth critics see the network-orientation
as a root cause for entrepreneurial inertia, risk aversion, and low investment in emerging new
technologies or infant industries. It has been recommended to dispose of the German system of
corporate governance or, at least, modify it by incorporating elements of the market-based
Anglo-American system.
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As noted by Mayer (1996), "Despite the intense debate, evidence on the effects of
different governance systems is still sparse." Most of the available empirical evidence on the
governance-performance link is based on Anglo-Saxon data. Therefore, the present paper aims to
contribute to the on-going corporate governance debate by providing empirical evidence on
German corporations. We investigate the impact of corporate governance indicators such as
ownership concentration, stock market exposure, board representation of owners, and the
location of control rights on profitability. In Section 2, the link between corporate governance
and firm performance as well as previous empirical evidence on Germany are discussed in more
detail. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis for a panel data set of 361 German corporations
over the time period 1991 to 1996. In Section 4, we summarize and conclude. In particular, we
find that ownership concentration affects profitability significantly negatively. However, this
result significantly depends on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights.
2 The Governed Corporation and Profitability
The major concern in the debate on the separation of ownership and control is whether managers
of widely-held corporations pursue their own interests (pet projects, empire building, perks etc.)
rather than maximizing shareholder value. Managers may not be adequately controlled by
shareholders because monitoring managers is expensive for an individual shareholder if he only
commands a negligible share in the firm. An extensive literature has discussed the pros and cons
of separating ownership from control.
9 Most recently, the market-based system of corporate
governance has again been seriously questioned by prominent scholars such as Porter (1992),
Jensen (1993), Roe (1994b), or Pound (1995) arguing for more shareholder activism.5
2.1 The governed vs. the managed corporation
A corporation with free-wheeling managers in charge of decision-making and, more or less,
controlling themselves is very much the image of the manager-controlled or managed
corporation Pound (1995) contrasts with the so-called governed corporation which he praises as
the ideal governance model for restructuring not only corporate America.
The main difference between managed and governed lies in the role the owners of
a company play in monitoring and disciplining the management. The managed corporation is
characterized by a clear separation of control and ownership. Senior management is in charge of
decision-making. The supervisory board is responsible for selecting and monitoring senior
managers, and replacing them in case of bad performance. The shareholders participate only
insofar as they can oust the supervisory board in a joint voting effort if the corporation does not
perform as expected. However, as monitoring and controlling efforts of any one shareholder
benefit all others, the free rider problem makes it expensive and unattractive for a small
shareholder to exercise and enforce voting rights. Moreover, coordinating a large number of
different shareholders for joint voting is difficult or even impossible. In times of crisis,
shareholders may then "prefer a cheap 'exit' to an expensive 'voice'  " (Bhide 1994, p. 132).
Further, corporate supervisory boards may be inefficient or 'entrenched' monitors. As Warner,
Watts and Wruck (1988) find, boards only take action when true performance disasters have
already happened.
10 Thus, Pound (1995, p. 92) claims that inadequate governance is inherent to
the managed corporation and "allows mistakes to go uncorrected until they become
catastrophes".
For a corporation to be governed in the sense of Pound, investors must be
different from the investors of a managed corporation. "Active" (Jensen 1993, p. 866) or
"relationship" (Thompson 1998, p. 27) investors are called for: investors not selling out quickly
in times of trouble because they are convinced that the company is being soundly managed and
that their interests and concerns are taken seriously by the management. The emphasis in the
model of the governed corporation is not on shareholders monitoring the managers more closely6
than in the managed corporation but on active participation of committed owners in the firm's
decision-making process. Active participation means in the first place being involved in
selecting the top management and initiating replacements in case of inferior performance.
However, for having one's interests and concerns respected, a relationship investor needs to be a
large shareholder as well, i.e., he must have sufficient control over the firm's assets.
11 Only
investors who control a substantial part of the voting capital will be able to keep managers from
diverting free cash flow into pet projects and force them to distribute profits to shareholders.
Pound's image of the governed corporation thus suggests that the stakes in a firm should be
concentrated in the hands of only a few shareholders. Implicitly it is claimed that by re-
integrating ownership and control corporate performance (profitability, productivity, innovative
thrust etc.) is going to be enhanced.
Demsetz (1983) has not been convinced of the arguments put forward by Berle
and Means and their followers. He argues that corporate plundering or, in his own words, on-the-
job consumption can happen in firms with concentrated ownership as well: "Where is it written
that the owner-manager of a closely held firm prefers to consume only at home?" (Demsetz
1983, p. 381) Contesting the model of the firm that implicitly underlies the managerial discretion
hypothesis as well as the agency approach, Demsetz states, "It is clearly an error to suppose that
a firm managed by its only owner comes closest to the profit-maximizing firm postulated in the
model firm of economic theory." (p. 383). For Demsetz, ownership concentration is the
endogenous and efficient outcome of a firm's response to its competitive environment. Product
market competition forces firms to adopt cost minimizing governance structures, at least in the
long run. The competitive market mechanism then eliminates inefficient structures and generates
good governance. From Demsetz' perspective, the mode of corporate governance does not affect
firm performance but is simultaneously determined with firm performance by the forces of
competitive markets.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp. 755) point out that large shareholders can inflict
substantial costs on other shareholders in the form of an expropriation-like redistribution of7
wealth if their interests diverge from those of the firms' small shareholders.
12 Furthermore,
Mayer (1996, p. 12) is concerned that a close relationship between large shareholders and
managers may prevent these large investors from taking necessary action in situations, "where
investors' reputations may suffer as a consequence of attempts to dismiss management".
As argued by Cubbin and Leech (1983), the location of control rights may be a
more important determinant of the degree of control to be exerted by owners than the degree of
ownership concentration. Internal control, or 'insider' control (Mayer 1996), may represent a
higher degree of control at any given level of blockholdings than external, or 'outsider', control.
Family interests, allied industrial firms, banks, and holdings companies are understood as
'insiders', while the shareholders of diffusely held firms are seen as 'outsiders'. In addition,
differences in commitment to a firm may emerge between individuals or families as owners
(who often are the company founders) and ownership by industrial firms or financial institutions.
Therefore, the location of control rights, respectively the identity of owners, may matter even
more. Under the German system of corporate governance with its high ownership concentration,
large shareholders may be the insiders or committed investors imagined by Pound and others,
exercising internal control by sitting on supervisory boards or by posing the CEO.
To sum up, the debate on the managed versus the governed corporation, or the
insider versus the outsider model of the corporate governance, has generated conflicting
hypotheses concerning the link between ownership, control, and firm performance. The
argumentation of Pound and others implies that the governed, or tightly-held, firm outperforms
the managed, or diffusely-held firm, whereas Demsetz suggests that corporate governance in
itself does not matter. Cubbin and Leech point to the identity of owners as a more important
governance indicator. The cost arguments of Shleifer and Vishny as well as Mayer suggest that
there may be a trade-off between the degree of governance exerted and advantages in corporate
performance. It is thus up to empirical research to test the validity of the advanced hypotheses.8
2.2 Empirical evidence
The existing empirical evidence refers almost exclusively to the Anglo-Saxon countries and does
not allow for clear-cut answers. Short (1994, p. 227) concludes that the studies surveyed by her
"do not provide conclusive evidence either in support of, or in opposition to, the hypothesis that
the ownership and control structures of firms materially affect their performance." Mayer (1996,
p. 17) interprets the empirical evidence as implying that there are "benefits in the exercise of
corporate governance from modest levels of concentrations of ownership", but that at high levels
of ownership concentration "exploitation of private benefits" may result.
Despite differences in corporate governance systems have been highlighted to
potentially translate into profitability differences, only a few empirical studies have investigated
the potential impact of governance indicators on performance for German firms. In a pioneering
study, Thonet and Poensgen (1979) found significantly lower returns on equity for owner-
controlled than for manager-controlled quoted stock corporations. A firm was defined as owner-
controlled if individuals or families held at least the blocking minority (25% plus one vote of the
voting capital). The major deficiency of the study is that ownership structures were identifiable
only for about 90 of the 300 firms. Thus in the regression analysis owner-controlled firms had to
be compared to a mixture of presumably manager-controlled firms and firms with unknown
governance structures, rendering the results questionable.
The studies of Cable (1985), Schmid (1996), Chirinko and Elston (1996), and
Weigand (1999) focused on banks as blockholders in industrial firms. Cable (1985) employed a
very small sample of 48 stock corporations from Germany's 100 largest corporations in 1970.
The cross-section regression for the time period 1968 to 1972 yielded a significantly positive
impact of bank involvement on profitability. A similar result is reported by Schmid (1996) for
the years 1974 and 1985. Chirinko and Elston (1996) explored the long-run relationship between
bank control and firm performance for 300 stock corporations over the observation period 1965
to 1990. Bank control was defined by different dichotomous variables indicating blockholdings
of banks or accumulated proxy voting rights. The coefficients of these indicator variables were9
insignificantly negative in cross-sectional OLS-regressions with return on total assets as
dependent variable. However, as in the Thonet and Poensgen study, detailed ownership
information was only available for subsets of the sample. Weigand (1999) applied a more
comprehensive data set which includes detailed ownership data (identity of owners, outstanding
shares) for 240 stock corporations in each year of the observation period 1965 to 1986. On
average (and in the long-run), bank-owned and family-owned firms were found to have
significantly higher returns on total assets than the group of presumably manager-controlled
(managed in the sense of Pound) firms.
Franks and Mayer (1997) analyzed a panel data set of 171 quoted corporations
over the period 1989 to 1994. Using a fixed effects panel regression approach, they could not
establish a significant impact of ownership variables or turnover of blockholdings on firm
performance. There was only weak evidence of a relationship between either management or
supervisory board turnover and performance in firms with concentrated ownership. This result is
consistent with Kaplan's (1994) findings. Franks and Mayer interpret their results as lending no
support to the view that the market in share stakes performs a disciplining function in Germany.
Rather, concentration of ownership may be "used to extract private benefits rather than wider
shareholder interests" (1997, p. 17).
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) studied the blockholdings-performance link for
the largest firms from five major industrialized countries. For the 99 publicly traded German
stock corporations incorporated in their sample they estimated a significantly negative and non-
linear impact of ownership concentration (measured by the percentage of shares outstanding held
by the largest shareholder) on the return on total assets over the period 1986 to 1991. Thus
profitability first decreases in ownership concentration and then, at higher levels of
concentration, rises again.
13 Goergen (1999) focussed on German IPOs. In both static and
dynamic panel data regressions, ownership concentration did not have any impact on
profitability (measured by cash flow over total assets) for the 86 IPOs observed over the period
1981 to 1988. Goergen interpreted his results as supporting the Demsetz hypothesis that10
ownership structure is chosen as to maximize firm value. Becht (1999) explored the impact of
ownership concentration on liquidity, as measured by the ratio of turnover to market
capitalization, among the companies included in the DAX100 index in 1996 to 1998. He found a
significantly negative effect of concentrated blockholdings.
3 Ownership Concentration, Insider Control, and Firm Performance
An Empirical Analysis of German Corporations
Rather than being a matter of technical explanations (small samples, cross-section vs. panel
regressions etc.) the conflicting results for Germany may reveal that the relationship between
ownership and profitability has changed over the decades examined. A significant positive
relationship seems to have existed for "governed" (owner-controlled) firms during the 1970s and
early 1980s (Cable, Schmid, Weigand), whereas the relationship vanishes or is even inverse
when the late 1980s and the 1990s are included (Becht, Chirinko and Elston, Franks and Mayer,
Goergen, Gedajlovic and Shapiro). The opening of markets and increased international
competition may have altered the profitability-ownership concentration relation since the late
1980s. To explore this conjecture we will study the ownership-profitability issue using a large
panel data set for the 1990s. To control for the importance of stock market exposure, we have
included non-quoted stock corporations as well as limited liability companies.
3.1 Data, variables, and sample characteristics
The data set used in the subsequent analysis contains 361 firms from the German mining and
manufacturing industries. The time period covered is 1991 to 1996, which yielded the largest
number of reporting firms with complete and consistent data. The balance sheet and profit-and-
loss information originates from three different sources: the Hoppenstedt Bilanzdatenbank, a
commercially sold data source, the Bundesanzeiger, a federal gazette (Amtsblatt), in which11
corporations are obliged by law to publish their annual financial statements, as well as annual
reports directly obtained from the corporations. We referred to the Bundesanzeiger or requested
annual reports from firms to double-check and correct deficiencies in the Hoppenstedt
Bilanzdatenbank (inconsistencies in reporting, missing values, obviously wrong entries etc.). We
used unconsolidated company data whenever available and excluded pure holding companies.
The sample firms can be classed as belonging to 30 different two-digit industries, among them
machinery (76 firms), chemicals & pharmaceuticals (60 firms), the electronic products industry
(56 firms), and iron & steel (37 firms). Most of the firms have the legal form of stock
corporations (Aktiengesellschaften, 300 companies). Only 183 of these stock corporations were
officially listed and traded on German stock exchanges during the observation period. In
addition to stock corporations also some limited liability corporations ('GmbH', 54 firms) as well
as limited commercial partnerships ('GmbH & Co. KG', 'KGaA', 7 firms) for which detailed
balance sheet data were available could be included.
In this study, we use the return on total assets (ROA) as an indicator of corporate
performance. In the descriptive tables we will also report the return on equity (ROE). Our
preferred measure of firm performance is however ROA, since ROE comparisons across firms
may be distorted by the leverage effect and differences in the user cost of capital. In either case,
the nominator of ROA and ROE is gross profits, calculated from firms' profit-and-loss-
statements as sales revenue minus expenses for personnel and materials. This definition is
equivalent to earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. Equity capital is defined as
shareholders' equity plus reserves, which also include pension liabilities. Pension liabilities are
added for two reasons. First, it is peculiar to the German system of accounting that pension
assets and pension liabilities are not netted out in companies' balance sheets. Further, pension
liabilities are not paid into a trust (pension fund) but remain within the firm. They are available
to the firm as a source of internal long-term finance. Pension liabilities thus can be seen as 'quasi'
equity. Second, the shareholders' equity of limited liablity companies (GmbH) is, by legal
construction, extremely low. Adding reserves and pension liabilities to shareholders' equity helps12
avoid generating unrealistically high returns on equity for these firms compared to stock
corporations.
To identify owners, share distributions, and composition of managing and
supervisory boards we used investors' handbooks on German companies edited by two German
commercial banks, Commerzbank and the former Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank
(now Hypo-Vereinsbank), as well as by a commercial publisher, Hoppenstedt. The handbooks
are Commerzbank's Wer gehört zu wem? (Who owns whom?, issues 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994),
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank ("Hypo-Guide") Wegweiser durch deutsche
Aktiengesellschaften (Guide of German Stock Corporations, annual issues 1988-1996), and
Hoppenstedt's Börsenführer (annual issues 1988-1996). In combining these data sources it was
possible to obtain a rather precise picture of voting stock ownership. In particular, in many cases
the Hypo-Guide also lists blocks smaller than 25% and indicates indirect ownership (voting
rights granted to a large shareholder from others shareholders). Sometimes even very small
blockholdings (below 5%) are reported. For the purposes of this study, we have defined a 'large'
shareholder as one who controls at least 5 per cent of a firm's voting capital. This cut-off point of
when a shareholder is large rather than small is not of so much relevance as it is in Anglo-Saxon
studies
14, since almost all firms have large shareholders who control at least 25 percent of the
voting capital. As Table 1 shows, 65% of the companies in the sample have one large
shareholder who, on average, controls 89% of the voting stocks and faces a group of small
shareholders with an aggregated share in the voting capital of 11%.
The degree of ownership concentration is the standard measure used in the
empirical literature to account for the extent of "governance" exercised by the owners of a firms.
In this study as in previous ones, ownership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index
of outstanding voting stock and, alternatively, by the percentage stake of the largest shareholder.
The share of the largest shareholder indicates her fundamental voting power, that is, the ability to
outvote other shareholders or initiate major changes by herself (e.g., ousting the supervisors,
introduce a new corporate charter). The Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of squared13
individual stakes, has the advantage of accounting for an asymmetric dispersion of shares among
different shareholders.
15
Ownership concentration may not suffice as an indicator of the degree of
"governance". The identity of owners may play a more crucial role. As discussed in more detail
in Becht and Boehmer (1997) as well as Boehmer (1999), officially reported shareholdings may
not reflect the true extent of voting control exercised by owners. Complex cross-shareholding
arrangements and unreported fiduciary and dormant voting rights complicate the identification of
actual controllers. Nevertheless, given the information available, we attempt to assess the
relevance of the owners' identity on the link between profitability and ownership concentration.
For grouping the sample firms according to the location of control rights five broad categories of
direct owners can be identified: another industrial firm or holding company (INDFIRM),
families or (voting pools of) individuals (FAMILY), financial institutions (banks or bank-owned
investment companies, insurance companies) (FININST), different large shareholders (MIX, e.g.
industrial firms and investment companies), and foreign owners (FOREIGN). A sixth group,
CHANGE, is defined to account for 26 firms for which a turnover of blockholdings from one of
these owner categories to another was observed during the observation period. For example, if
an industrial firm sold its stake in a firm completely to another industrial firm we treated such a
transfer of shareholdings not as a change in the location of control rights, since the new owner
again belonged to the same owner category. If, however, the owning industrial firm sold only
part of its holdings to another industrial firm so that the new co-owner could be seen as an
additional large shareholder we counted such a transfer as "change" (from INDFIRM to MIX).
The groups are mutually exclusive, that is, a firm that had as an identified shareholder, for
example, another industrial firm in some years and a bank in other years only appears in the
CHANGE group but not in the groups INDFIRM or FININST. Due to the lack of detailed owner
information, the foreign-owned firms were also treated as a separate sub-group. A few firms are
owned by foundations which have no owner in a strict sense. It is thus unclear who really
controls decisions. However, since these foundations are close to the founding families of these14
firms, as in the case of Bosch GmbH (a leading electronic products firm), it is not unreasonable
to classify them to the group of firms controlled by families or voting pools of individuals. The
group of firms with widely dispersed shareholdings seems to be missing. We have 15 stock
corporations in the sample for which more than 75% of voting capital is dispersedly held. The
following firms from our sample can be seen as "widely dispersed" (average aggregated share of
dispersed holdings 1991-96 in brackets): Bayer (92.00%), Mannesmann (100.00%), Schering
(92.80%), Siemens (91.70%), and VEBA (96.70%). However, the study of Baums and Fraune
(1995) shows that in the 1992 annual shareholders' meetings banks controlled an aggregate of
more than 90% of these firms' voting capital via associated investment companies and proxy
votes. The firms were therefore added to the group of firms with financial institutions as largest
shareholders. However, since this information on aggregated proxy voting rights was only
available for one year we have not used it in the calculation of the Herfindahl-index itself but
rather as qualitative information for classifying firms. Table 2 gives the details of the group
definitions and examples of firms classified as well as definitions of all other variables used in
this study.
Table 2 about here
To relate back to Pound's argument of the managed vs. the governed firm as well
as the insider vs. outsider-distinction, corporations having individuals or families (FAMILY),
financial institutions (FININST), or different independent large shareholders (MIX) may be
interpreted as potentially governed by committed insiders. By contrast, for firms owned by
another industrial firm or holding company (INDFIRM) it might be hired managers rather than
ultimate owners who control the managers of the owned company. Most of the firms of this
group were majority-owned by one of the following large quoted stock corporations: BASF
(90% dispersed holdings), Bayer (92%), Daimler-Benz (32%), Dt. Babcock (100%), Krupp-
Hoesch (14%), MAN (70%), Mannesmann (100%), Preussag (48%), Siemens (92%), Thyssen15
(66%), or VEBA (97%). The firms from the INDFIRM group could then be considered as
potentially managed, since the largest shareholder tends to be - at least for German standards - a
dispersedly held large stock corporation. However, we make no attempt here to argue that a
certain location of control rights indeed implies "more"or "less" effective governance. Without
conducting in-depth case studies on each firm a case for insiders as owners to be more
"committed" or "active" investors can hardly be made. It is therefore not entirely clear whether
these owners really "govern", or whether hired managers nonetheless exercise control even if
ownership concentration is high and firms are owned by families, for example.
To investigate whether stock market exposure makes a difference for the potential
link between governance indicators and corporate performance we distinguish between
corporations traded on the stock exchange (QUOTED) and non-traded or non-stock corporations
(NON-QUOTED).
Table 3A presents the mean and median values of selected variables for the full
sample and the sub-samples of quoted and non-quoted firms. Comparing the groups of quoted
and non-quoted firms, the last column reports statistics of testing the hypotheses of equal group
means (t-statistic) and medians (Mann-Whithney statistic). Quoted firms have significantly
higher average returns on total assets and also higher median returns on equity. The quoted firms
are less levered. Further, as measured by sales, employment, and the log of total assets, the
quoted firms are substantially larger on average but the median firms do not differ significantly
in sales or total assets. Finally, quoted firms realized significantly higher growth of turnover than
non-quoted firms.
Table 3A about here
Table 3B contains descriptive statistics of selected variables for the subgroups of
firms classified by the identity of the largest owner. For any pair of subgroups and the variables
listed in Table 3B we also conducted pairwise t- and median tests not reported here separately.
1616
The tests reveal that the INDFIRM firms have significantly lower rates of return than any other
subgroup except for the equity return of firms controlled by financial institutions. Ownership
concentration is the highest for the managed firms. Family-controlled firms have the highest
ROE and the second highest ROA but their share of equity capital is the lowest of all groups.
Bank-controlled firms have the highest share of equity capital and thus the lowest degree of
leverage. Foreign-owned firms have the highest ROA and the second highest ROE.
Table 3B about here
3.2 Regression model and hypotheses
To investigate the impact of the mode of corporate governance on corporate performance we use
the following empirical model consisting of two panel regression equations
(1) it t i
j
it t i it it it it it it a H b C b K b G b S b B b OC b ROA ε λ + + + + + + + + + = − 7 1 , 6 5 4 3 2 1 ,




it it it it it it a H d C d N d G d S d B d ROA d OC ε λ + + + + + + + + + = − 7 1 , 6 5 4 3 2 1
in which the subscript  361 , , 1 = i  identifies individual firms,  30 , , 1 = j  indicates the
respective two-digit industry, and  1996 , , 1992  = t  denotes time periods.
In regression (1), the return on total assets, ROA, is regressed on ownership
concentration OC and a set of other variables. For lucidity and space restrictions we will only
present results using the unbounded Herfindahl index as in Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
17  B
indicates the presence of the largest shareholder on the executive board. The following variables,
well-known from the industrial organization literature on the determinants of profitability, serve
as right-hand side control variables: absolute firm size S (natural logarithm of total assets), firm17
growth G (logarithmic annual change in turnover), capital intensity K (tangible assets divided by
the number of employees), capital structure C (shareholders' equity plus reserves divided by total
capital), and the Herfindahl index of supplier concentration at the two-digit industry level
(source: German Statistical Office). These variabes will be discussed in more detail below. The
regression equation further includes firm-specific effects  i a , time-specific effects  t λ , and a
classical regression error term  it ε . The firm- and time-specific effects are supposed to control for
systematic variation in profitability not captured by the independent variables (e.g., differences
in risk taking or in the cost of capital).
18
As hypothesized by Demsetz, in active and well-functioning markets for
corporate control rights ownership concentration and profitability should be simultaneously
determined. To test for simultaneity bias in regression equation (1) we "endogenize" ownership
concentration in regression equation (1) and estimate (1) and (2) by applying standard
instrumental variable techniques (2SLS). As theory is still rather silent on potential determinants
of ownership concentration, regression equation (2) is an ad-hoc specification.
19 In the reduced-
form regression we regress ownership concentration on all other right-hand side variables in (1)
plus the number of large shareholders, N
LS. In the second-stage regression, we employ in (1) and
(2) the fitted values of OC and ROA from the reduced-form regressions instead of their observed
values. To identify the two-equation system capital intensity is excluded from (2), while the
number of large shareholders is excluded from (1) in the second-stage regressions.
20
Our main interest lies in estimating the coefficients  1 b  and  2 b . If ownership
concentration indicates tighter and performance-enhancing governance exerted by owners,
0 1 > b  is to be expected. If the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis is valid,  0 1 = b  should be found. By
contrast, 0 1 < b  may indicate inefficiency or rent extraction due to the presence of large
shareholders. The same argumentation holds for the presence of the largest shareholder on the
executive board.
For the impact of firm size and firm growth on profitability economic theory
offers no clear-cut predictions. The economies of scale and scope argument, as advanced e.g. by18
Baumol (1959), implies a positive effect of absolute firm size. Organizational inefficiencies (X-
inefficiency) and also lower risk premiums because of diversification could render  3 b  negative.
21
Firm growth may, on the one hand, reflect better investment opportunities that allow for a higher
profitability, implying  0 4 > b . On the other hand, managers could indeed have sufficient
discretion to divert free cash flow and overinvest so that profitability decreases in firm growth,
0 4 < b . The coefficient on capital intensity may help to identify overinvestment. If decreasing
scale economies prevail, profitability should decrease in capital intensity,  0 5 < b . However,
capital intensity may indicate barriers to entry and exit, as frequently assumed in the IO
literature, which allow incumbent firms to earn rents. The coefficient of capital intensity should
then be positive. With imperfect capital markets capital structure matters for investment
decisions and firm profitability. Depending on informational asymmetries, transaction costs, and
growth prospects capital structure choices will vary across firms and industries. If a higher
equity share implies a lower risk of bankruptcy, an inverse relation between profitability and the
share of equity capital, C, can be expected,  0 6 < b , since the return on investment compensating
for risk-taking decreases in risk. To reduce potential simultaneity bias C is lagged by one
period.
22 Supplier concentration is implied by oligopoly theory to be positively correlated with
profitability. An extensive empirical literature has examined, and overwhelmingly supported, the
positive profitability-concentration relation.
23 We therefore expect  0 7 > b . As it is not the
concern of this paper to discuss the appropriate interpretation of the relationship, we take market
concentration as a summary measure of industry characteristics, reflecting technology (potential
scale economies), demand (price elasticity) as well as the intensity of competition.
The regression equations are estimated using a GLS panel estimator described in
Hsiao (1986, pp. 55) which allows for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation of the
regression residuals.
24 Standard specification tests for panel data regressions are employed to test
for the presence of fixed effects ("Hausman test", Hausman 1978), heteroskedasticity (Lagrange
multiplier test, Breusch and Pagan 1980), and first-order serial correlation (modified Durbin-
Watson test, see Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendanathan 1982).19
3.3 Results
Ownership concentration, stock market exposure, and profitability
Table 4A contains the coefficient estimates for the profitability regression. Column 1 reports the
regression coefficients using the full sample of firms. Column 2 presents the estimates for the
quoted firms, while column 3 gives the coefficient differences with respect to the (not separately
reported) regression coefficients of the non-quoted firms. Ownership concentration affects ROA
significantly negative. This negative impact of ownership concentration is somewhat weaker for
the quoted (-0.0024) than for the non-quoted firms (-0.0051) but the coefficient difference (-
0.0031) is not statistically significant. The coefficient on board representation of the largest
shareholder is insignificantly negative (and remains so when ownership concentration is
excluded from the regressions). Larger firms and firms with a higher share of equity capital
(lower leverage) have significantly lower returns, which is consistent with risk-return
considerations. Firm growth and market concentration affect ROA positively. Firm-specific
effects are highly significant, implying that there are systematic firm-specific influences not
captured by the included right-hand side variables. Time-specific effects are insignificant as long
as capital intensity is included in the regression but become highly significant when capital
intensity is excluded. Our measure of capital intensity thus seems to pick up cyclical effects
(capital utilization). The Hausman test confirms that the firm- and time-specific effects are fixed
(constant) rather than random(ly distributed across firms).
Tables 4A and 4B
Table 4B summarizes for the full sample the results from assuming that
profitability and ownership concentration are simultaneously determined. Columns 1 and 2
contain the reduced-form (first-stage) and second-stage estimates for the profitability regression
(1), columns 3 and 4 the respective estimates for the ownership concentration regression (2).20
Regarding the profitability regression, endogenizing ownership concentration does not change
any of the results of Table 4A. The same holds true for distinguishing between quoted and non-
quoted firms, not reported here separately. The test statistic of the Wu-Hausman is low and
insignificant at any conventional level of significance, indicating that there is no simultaneity
bias in the profitability regression. In other words, ownership concentration can be taken as
exogenous with respect to profitability. Ownership concentration is significantly lower for firms
which are larger, use more capital per employee, and have more equity capital. By contrast,
growing firms and firms operating under more concentrated market structures have more
concentrated ownership structures. ROA affects ownership concentration negatively but the Wu-
Hausman test statistic is highly significant so that there is simultaneity bias. Therefore, ROA
cannot be assumed exogenous in the ownership concentration regression.
The Identity of Owners
Considering the location of control rights Table 5A gives some new insights.
25 The group of
firms owned by another industrial firm, INDFIRM, is taken as the base group. Column 1
presents the regression coefficients for this base group, whereas the following columns contain
the estimates of coefficient differences with respect to the other groups of owners. The
coefficient on ownership concentration is positive but insignificant for the INDFIRM firms. For
these firms, which might be managed rather than governed, ownership concentration has no
systematic effect on ROA. The negative impact of ownership concentration found for the full
sample of firms can be traced back to the firms owned, and possibly governed, by FAMILY and
MIX. For the MIX firms the negative coefficient suggests that larger asymmetries in
shareholders' stakes translate into lower profitability. In other words, the presence of a strong
second or third large shareholder enhances profitability. A negative but insignificant effect also
turns up for the firms owned by foreigners and the firms that experienced a change in owners.
Ownership concentration makes a significantly positive difference for firms potentially governed
by financial institutions. In this group of firms ownership concentration is by far the lowest (see21
Table 3B). By German standards, these firms can almost be defined as "dispersedly held".
Finally, Table 5B extends the analysis to taking stock market exposure into account. Now it
becomes clear that the negative ownership concentration effect results particularly from the non-
quoted firms owned by families (individuals, foundations) or foreigners but also from quoted
firms which have different large shareholders.
4 Summary and conclusion
Almost a decade ago Michael C. Jensen (1993, p. 873) has set out the research agenda for the
new millenium in the field of corporate governance, corporate finance, and corporate
performance:
For those with a normative bent, making the internal control systems of
corporations work is the major challenge facing economists and management
scholars in the 1990s. For those who choose to take a purely positive approach,
the major challenge is understanding how these systems work, and how they
interact with other control forces (in particular the product and factor markets,
legal, political, and regulatory systems, and the capital markets) impinging on the
corporation.
This paper contributes to the positive approach. We focused on German firms because ownership
concentration is an important feature setting the German system of corporate governance apart
from the Anglo-Saxon. In the corporate governance literature ownership concentration is often
understood as reflecting a stronger governing effort of owners. By reducing informational
asymmetries between owners and managers as well as between the firm and external investors
ownership concentration is expected to affect firm profitability positively. Contrary to this
argument, we find a significantly negative impact of ownership concentration on profitability as
measured by the return on total assets.22
Ownership concentration can be an insufficient or misleading indicator of the
control that owners actually exert. We therefore checked further governance indicators.
Representation of the largest shareholder on the board of executive directors did not turn out to
make a significant difference for profitability. However, the profitability-ownership
concentration relation depends on both stock market exposure and the location of control rights.
The negative effect of ownership concentration could be traced back to family- or foreign-owned
non-quoted firms as well as quoted firms with different large shareholders. A positive impact of
ownership concentration on profitability, supportive of managerial discretion and agency
theories, showed up for quoted firms which have financial institutions as large shareholders.
Further, simple group comparisons of mean and median profitability (ROA, ROE) imply that
stock market exposure is profitability-enhancing.
Finally, we have to answer the question posed in this paper: Does the governed
corporation perform better? If one is willing to view firms owned by families, financial
institutions, or a mix of large shareholders as (potentially) governed rather than managed, the
answer to the question seems to be yes. These groups had significantly higher mean and median
profitabilities than the group of firms owned by another industrial firm. These results raise more
questions than they answer. First, why are profitability differences between the group of firms
owned by another industrial firm and all other groups so pronounced? Do the owning firms
extract rents by e.g. charging high transfer prices from the owned firms? Second, significant
profitability differences also exist between the different groups of firms that may be governed.
What cuases these differences? Third, industry characteristics such as the underlying technology
and knowledge conditions may simultaneously determine governance structures, investment, and
profitability.
26 In industries such as optical instruments or machinery, production technology and
the knowledge on which firm know-how is based does not require large firm sizes per se, that is,
cost advantages (scale economies) from large-scale operations (production, R&D) are not
ubiquitous. Therefore, these industries offer a favorable environment for smaller firms, and
indeed that is where we find small family-owned firms to be very common. By contrast, in the23
chemical and pharmaceutical industry stock corporations dominate. Clearly, production
technologies require large firm sizes. Different ownership structures are also necessary to satisfy
the increased capital needs and to spread the higher risk involved in large-scale operations. To
get a more comprehensive picture of the impact of governance structures on firm performance,
future research should focus on the link between industry characteristics, firm financing,
investment, and profitability.
In sum, our study finds systematic influences of ownership concentration, stock
market exposure, and the location of control rights on the profitability of German corporations.
Our main results imply that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance
profitability, and (2) concentrated ownership might be a sub-optimal choice for many of the
tightly held German corporations.24
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Endnotes
1 See e.g. Porter (1992), Jensen (1993), Blair (1995), Monks and Minow (1995), Berglöf (1997),
Keasey et al. (1997), Mayer (1996, 1998), Hopt et al. (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998),
Zingales (1998), OECD (1999) for a broad discussion.
2 See Jensen and Ruback (1983) for a survey and discussion.
3  See, more recently, e.g. Porter (1992), Jensen (1993), Roe (1994a,b), Bhide (1993, 1994),
Pound (1995), Monks and Minow (1995), Schnitzer (1997). As Bhide (1994, p. 129, p. 131)
argues, "Unwittingly, the system [of U.S. securities regulations and disclosure rules] nurtures
market liquidity at the expense of good governance. … U.S. rules that protect investors don't just
sustain market liquidity, they also drive a wedge between shareholders and managers. Instead of
yielding long-term shareholders who concentrate their holdings in a few companies, where they
provide informed oversight and counsel, the laws promote diffused, arm's length stockholding."
4 See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) as well as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey of the
field.
5 See for a survey of European systems of corporate governance e.g. Baums (1996), Mayer
(1998), and Hopt et al. (1998).
6 Bayer and Mannesmann may serve as examples.
7  In December 1998, 323 domestic corporations with an aggregate market capitalization of
1,822,103 million DM were quoted and officially traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. At the
same time, 2,399 domestic corporations (3,829,375 million DM) were listed on the London stock
exchange and 2,722 (17,373,835 million DM) on the New York stock exchange. (Source:
Deutsche Börse, Factbook, Frankfurt, http://www.exchange.de). See Boehmer (1999) for a
thorough analysis of ownership structures and location of control rights in 430 stock
corporations officially traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange in 1996. According to this study,
banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies controlled as large blockholders
almost 80% of the median firm's voting rights, or roughly 50% of the overall market value of
firms officially listed.
8 See e.g. the criticism levelled by Perlitz and Seeger (1994, 1995) or Audretsch and Elston
(1997). The implementation of the so-called Neuer Markt (new market) on which shares in
innovative young firms are traded can be seen as a step in the direction of a more market-based
system of corporate finance.
9 See e.g. Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Williamson (1964), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama
(1980), Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen (1986,
1988). See Short (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Zingales (1998) for further discussion.
10 In Germany, the case of Metallgesellschaft may serve as an example of supervisory board
failure. The Deutsche Bank, being represented on the supervisory board as a major debtholder,
was regarded responsible for the disaster and scolded in the business press for insufficient and
bad monitoring. See Frankel and Palmer (1996) for further discussion.
11 What insufficient control over a firm's assets means, is nicely depicted by the General Motors
example cited in Roe (1994a, XII). In 1990, two 'large' (relative to all other shareholders)29
institutional investors, being dissatisfied with the company's bad performance, wanted to
negotiate the implementation of a new CEO with GM's leaders. The management could calmly
decline the request −  each 'large' shareholder only accounted for less than one per cent of the
voting capital. In 1992 GM's top management had to take action after all. As losses piled up to
over $6 billlion, CEO Robert Stempel was eventually fired.
12 Having large investors may entail costs of "straightforward expropriation of other investors,
managers, and employees; inefficient expropriation through pursuit of personal (non-profit
maximizing) objectives; and finally the incentive effects of expropriation on the other
stakeholders"(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, pp. 755).
13 This U-formed relationship also turned up for the US firms in the sample. Coefficients were
insignificantly negative for firms from the UK, France and Canada.
14 See the discussion in Short (1994, p. 216).
15 As disclosure of smaller blockholdings was not mandatory during the observation period, the
calculated Herfindahl index can only be an approximation to the true degree of ownership
concentration. For corporations with missing information on this "dispersed" portion of
shareholdings two alternative Herfindahl indices were constructed. One measure treats the
"dispersed" portion as one block. Using the means in Table 1 for corporations with only one
large shareholder as an example, the Herfindahl index is (89.07)
2 + (10.93)
2 = 8,053. The other
measure assumes that the dispersed portion is equally distributed among an unknown number of
shareholders, each holding at most 1% block of stocks, which yields a Herfindahl index of
(89.07)
2 + 10× (1.00)
2 + (0.93)
2 = 7,944.
16 The results are available from the authors on request.
17 The Herfindahl-Index in its standard definition is restricted to take on values between 0 and
10,000. The logit transformation log [H/(10,000-H)] yields an "unbounded" variable. In the case
of Mannesmann, for which ownership of voting shares is reported to be "100% dispersed", H
was set at 1 in the transformation. For firms with only one owner holding 100% of voting stock,
H was set at 9,999. In alternative regression runs we used the bounded Herfindahl-Index as well
as the share of the largest shareholder plus its squared value as in Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998).
Further, we replaced ROA by ROE. We also tested more parsimonious specifications, leaving
out (some of) the variables implied by industrial organization theory. As the estimates with
respect to governance indicators do not differ significantly, we do not report the results from
these alternative specifications here. They are available from the authors on request.
18 See e.g. Hsiao (1986) or Baltagi (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of panel data models
and appropriate estimation techniques.
19 See, however, the interesting theoretical approaches by Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997),
Bolton and von Thadden (1998) as well as Pagano and Röell (1998).
20 We tested alternative exclusions of variables, since picking a specific variable is - admittedly -
arbitrary. The results, however, do not change significantly with respect to the governance
indicators if any other variable is excluded.
21 See the argument advanced above in connection with quoted firms.
22 See the discussion in Hall and Weiss (1967) and Brealy and Myers (1984, pp. 362).30
23 See for discussion e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990) or Martin (1993).
24 The procedure uses Within-OLS to obtain consistent first-step estimates. From the first-step
residuals the serial correlation coefficient is estimated. The regression is then transformed to
eliminate serial correlation and is re-estimated by GLS, applying White's (1980) procedure to
obtain heteroskedaticity-robust standard errors.
25 As our specification tests show that the firm- and time-specific effects are fixed rather than
random, we cannot consider the location-of-control-rights-groups directly in the panel regression
by including dummy variables. The problem is that such indicator variables would vary across
firms but not in time. Only for the firms included in CHANGE there would be time series
variation. Time-invariable variables cannot be estimated in a fixed effects model because they
are perfectly correlated with the fixed (i.e., time-constant) individual effects. See Baltagi (1995,
p. 11).
26 See Audretsch and Weigand (1999).